Lifestyle

Japan's 2026 Tourist Tax Hike and the 60 Million Visitor Goal

Summary

Japan's 2026 tourism pricing overhaul simultaneously implemented three distinct price changes: the departure tax tripled from ¥1,000 to ¥3,000, Kyoto's accommodation tax was restructured into a five-tier progressive system with rates rising up to tenfold in the highest bracket, and visa fees were increased fivefold for the first time since 1978. These measures carry the official label of "overtourism countermeasures," yet Japan's government confirmed a record goal of 60 million visitors and ¥15 trillion in tourism spending by 2030 through a Cabinet decision in March 2026. Visitor arrivals for January through September 2026 fell 2.9% year-on-year to 30.73 million, but JNTO attributed the decline to typhoon-related flight cancellations, elevated airfares, and the ongoing steep drop in Chinese visitors following a travel advisory issued by China's foreign ministry in November 2025 — making it impossible to isolate any tax effect. Research on comparable European tourist taxes in Barcelona, Amsterdam, and Venice found no meaningful evidence that such levies reduce visitor numbers, with researchers noting they tend to become revenue tools rather than crowd-control instruments. Korean visitors — exempt from visa fees and largely unaffected by modest mid-tier accommodation tax increments — surged to record monthly highs in August and September 2026, illustrating that exchange rates and visa-free access far outweigh the deterrent effect of the new tax structure.

Key Points

1

The Structure and Reality of Japan's Three 2026 Price Increases

Japan's 2026 tourism pricing overhaul combined three distinct measures with different structures, timing, and affected populations — and collapsing them into a single narrative misses the most important details. The departure tax tripled from ¥1,000 to ¥3,000 on July 1, 2026, applying equally to everyone departing Japan including Japanese nationals, with estimated fiscal 2026 revenue of approximately ¥130 billion — up from ¥52.5 billion in fiscal 2024, roughly a 2.5-fold jump. Kyoto's accommodation tax, restructured effective March 1, 2026, operates on a five-tier progressive scale ranging from ¥200 for stays under ¥6,000 per night up to ¥10,000 for stays at ¥100,000 and above, with annual city revenue projected to rise from ¥5.2 billion to ¥12.6 billion. The visa fee increase — single-entry from ¥3,000 to ¥15,000, multiple-entry from ¥6,000 to ¥30,000, effective July 1, 2026 and the first revision since 1978 — applies only to nationals of countries that require a visa to enter Japan, leaving travelers from Korea, the United States, and other visa-exempt nations completely unaffected for short-stay tourism. The "tenfold increase" headline refers exclusively to Kyoto's highest accommodation tier at ¥100,000 per night and above; applying it to all travelers is factually misleading, since mid-range accommodation guests pay ¥400–¥1,000. These three measures represent flat-rate taxation, progressive taxation, and selective country-of-origin taxation respectively — three different instruments with three different equity implications that require separate analysis.

2

Why the 60 Million Target and Tax Increases Coexist

Japan's government confirmed a record target of 60 million inbound visitors and ¥15 trillion in tourism consumption by 2030 through a formal Cabinet decision on March 27, 2026 — the Fifth Basic Plan for the Promotion of Tourism — while simultaneously raising tourist taxes in a move that superficially looks contradictory. Reaching 60 million from 2025's record of 42.68 million requires roughly 1.4x growth over four years, a pace that JTB Tourism Research & Consulting characterized as dependent on economic conditions in origin countries rather than on a continued post-pandemic rebound surge. The resolution of the apparent contradiction lies in Japan's per-visitor spending target: average consumption is set to rise from approximately ¥229,000 per person in 2025 to ¥250,000 by 2030, making the strategy fundamentally about maximizing revenue per visitor rather than managing crowd size. European precedents in Barcelona, Amsterdam, and Venice demonstrate consistently that tourist taxes do not meaningfully reduce visitor counts — and Japan's government is almost certainly aware of this track record. The taxes, in this reading, are the revenue-capture component of a "more visitors, higher per-person revenue" formula, with "overtourism countermeasure" serving as the political framing rather than the operational goal. Setting a 60 million visitor target while raising taxes on tourists isn't incoherence — it's a strategy informed precisely by the evidence that taxes don't reduce tourist traffic, freeing Japan to pursue both more visitors and more revenue simultaneously.

3

JNTO's Explanation for the 2026 Visitor Decline Doesn't Mention Taxes

Inbound visitor arrivals for January through September 2026 totaled 30.73 million, down 2.9% from the same period in 2025, with August falling 9.6% year-on-year and September declining 5.0% — two consecutive months of decline against a 2025 that set all-time records with 42.68 million total arrivals. JNTO's official explanation for the decline cites the sustained impact of a travel advisory issued by China's foreign ministry on November 14, 2025, typhoon-related flight cancellations, and elevated international airfares — not tax increases. Chinese visitor data illustrates the scale of the structural disruption: August arrivals from China came in at 418,000, down 59.0% year-on-year, and September arrivals were 430,800, down 44.5%, with monthly declines running between 44% and 61% across the period. Korean visitors moved in the opposite direction, with August at 850,500 (up 28.7%) and September at 842,300 (up 25.6%), becoming Japan's single largest inbound market by volume — strong evidence that the tax increases have not deterred travelers from non-visa-required markets with favorable exchange rates. The key analytical point is that 2026 provides no clean basis for attributing the visitor decline to tax increases, nor for concluding that the taxes had no effect — the signal is completely buried under larger external shocks. Meaningful evaluation of the tax effect requires a period in which the China variable stabilizes, airfares normalize, and other confounding factors settle down.

4

Kyoto's Progressive Tax Structure Flips the "Budget Traveler" Narrative

Calculating Kyoto's accommodation tax as a percentage of the accommodation fee rather than as a headline multiplier produces a picture that differs substantially from the "tax bomb" framing common in media coverage. At the lowest tier — stays under ¥6,000 — the tax remains at ¥200, unchanged from before, representing a negligible fraction of the accommodation cost with zero additional burden on budget travelers. At a mid-range ¥15,000 hotel, the ¥400 tax represents approximately 2.7% of the nightly rate; at ¥50,000 it rises to ¥4,000 (8%); and at ¥100,000 and above it reaches ¥10,000, or approximately 10% — the highest rate applies exclusively to the highest-priced category. This progressive structure directly refutes the common critique that tourist accommodation taxes disproportionately burden budget travelers: in Kyoto's case, budget guests pay both the lowest absolute amount and the lowest effective rate. The ¥200–¥10,000 range represents a fifty-fold difference between the lowest and highest brackets, and that design logic — concentrating the fiscal burden on luxury-tier accommodation — could serve as a template for other destinations debating how to structure tourist levies equitably. The flatly regressive element in the 2026 package sits not in the accommodation tax but in the ¥3,000 departure levy and the ¥15,000 visa fee, both of which apply identically regardless of a traveler's spend level.

5

The European Tourist Tax Precedent and the Revenue Dependency Risk

Research on European cities that have implemented tourist taxes offers a consistent lesson directly applicable to Japan: taxes reliably generate municipal revenue but have not demonstrably reduced visitor numbers. At the University of Barcelona, researcher Núria Guitart-Casalderrey told National Geographic that "These charges haven't deterred tourists from visiting Barcelona" — a city that has raised tourist levies multiple times without observing meaningful crowd reduction. Tilburg University's Greg Richards identified a troubling trajectory in Amsterdam, where the accommodation tax was originally conceived as a crowd-control mechanism but has arguably become a municipal revenue instrument, noting it is "difficult to tell if it will have a significant effect, or simply plug a hole in the Municipal budget." In Venice, University Ca' Foscari researcher Jan van der Borg assessed that doubling the entry fee would be "unlikely to reduce tourism to a manageable level," suggesting that the price elasticity of tourism demand is too low for modest fees to function as effective deterrents. The structural risk this pattern creates is what might be called the revenue dependency trap: once governments and municipalities have incorporated tourist tax receipts into their operating budgets — ¥130 billion nationally and ¥12.6 billion in Kyoto — reducing visitor numbers starts to represent a fiscal problem rather than a policy achievement. Japan's simultaneous pursuit of 60 million visitors and increased tourist taxation fits this European template precisely: the taxes are revenue infrastructure, the overtourism language is political cover, and the incentive structure makes genuine crowd reduction increasingly unlikely over time.

Positive & Negative Analysis

Positive Aspects

  • Stable Revenue Base for Tourism Infrastructure and Cultural Heritage

    The tax increases materially expand the revenue available for tourism infrastructure investment: departure tax revenue is projected to rise from ¥52.5 billion to approximately ¥130 billion annually, while Kyoto's accommodation tax revenue is expected to grow from ¥5.2 billion to ¥12.6 billion — a combined increase of roughly ¥85 billion per year that creates real capacity for sustained investment. Kyoto City has publicly committed this revenue to public transit improvements, waste management, cultural heritage preservation, multilingual visitor information systems, and a new direct bus route from Kyoto Station to the Higashiyama district. Investing in tourism infrastructure creates compounding returns: improved transit reduces crowding and travel friction for residents and visitors alike, while heritage preservation sustains the cultural assets that make destinations worth visiting in the first place. If the revenue actually flows to the designated uses — which requires transparent accounting and public reporting — the case for the tax becomes substantially stronger than its crowd-management credentials alone would support. The fact that Kyoto's new accommodation tax structure is projected to nearly 2.5-fold city revenue gives local government real capacity to address the infrastructure deficits that overtourism has exposed, rather than relying on ad hoc responses. Honorable as that outcome would be, it depends entirely on whether the spending commitments are honored — which makes transparency of tax use the most important variable in evaluating this policy's long-term value.

  • Equity by Design: Progressive Rates That Spare Budget Travelers

    Kyoto's five-tier progressive accommodation tax structure represents a genuine design achievement in the typically contested politics of tourist taxation. The lowest tier — under ¥6,000 per night — remains at ¥200, unchanged from the previous rate, meaning budget travelers face no additional burden from the restructuring whatsoever. As accommodation cost rises through the brackets, the effective tax rate also rises, reaching approximately 10% at the ¥100,000-and-above tier — a burden that falls entirely on luxury-tier guests who can most plausibly absorb it. This design directly answers the most common equity criticism of tourist accommodation taxes: that they fall hardest on price-sensitive travelers. The fifty-fold range from the lowest to highest bracket (¥200 to ¥10,000) is a compelling proof-of-concept that progressive tourist levies are structurally feasible and not merely theoretical, demonstrating that how you design the rate structure matters as much as whether you impose a tax at all. If Kyoto's model demonstrates that progressive accommodation taxes can generate substantial revenue while maintaining equitable rate distribution, it could become a reference design for cities across Asia and Europe that are grappling with how to structure tourist levies without disproportionately burdening lower-income travelers.

  • Multi-Layered Crowd Management Beyond Pricing

    Kyoto's approach to overtourism extends well beyond the accommodation tax to include a sophisticated set of non-price management tools, which suggests the city recognizes that pricing alone is insufficient for meaningful crowd distribution. Pre-booking requirements for the Higashiyama parking district, real-time digital congestion maps, park-and-ride connections, and a baggage-free tourism campaign are all operational, addressing the experiential dimension of overtourism without adding to visitor costs. The discontinuation of the all-day bus pass in favor of a combined subway-and-bus transit pass at ¥1,100 is a particularly practical intervention: it redistributes tourist foot traffic from overcrowded buses onto the subway network, directly addressing the mobility equity issue where tourists blocking local residents from boarding buses has been among the most persistent complaints. Using transit system design — rather than pricing — to solve distribution problems is a scalable approach that other high-traffic destinations can study without requiring significant legislative change. The combination of price instruments (accommodation tax) and non-price instruments (parking reservations, transit restructuring, digital tools) reflects a more mature policy toolkit than relying on taxes alone. The investment in digital infrastructure — real-time congestion monitoring — also creates a feedback mechanism that improves over time and allows for more precise management responses as the data set grows.

  • Quality Tourism Transition and Regional Distribution

    The government's plan to expand designated overtourism response zones from 47 to 100 locations indicates an intent to redistribute visitor demand from the most concentrated urban destinations across a broader range of Japanese localities — an approach that addresses the structural root of overtourism more effectively than price barriers alone. If departure tax revenue actually flows to regional tourism infrastructure development as promised, it could build the supply-side capacity that makes it possible for Japan to absorb more visitors without concentrating the burden on a small number of destinations. The per-visitor spending target of ¥250,000 by 2030 — up from approximately ¥229,000 in 2025 — signals a deliberate pivot from high-volume, low-spend mass tourism toward higher-value visitor segments, which typically generate less physical crowding per unit of economic contribution. Regional distribution of visitors also activates economic benefits in communities that currently see little of the tourism revenue captured in Tokyo, Kyoto, and Osaka, which strengthens the case for the policy from a geographic equity perspective. Successfully transitioning to this quality-over-quantity model would position Japan's tourism sector for more sustainable long-run growth, as destinations that compete purely on volume face compressing margins and declining resident quality of life. The two-pronged strategy — revenue capture in the short run, infrastructure expansion in the medium run — is at least theoretically coherent, even if execution over the next several years will determine whether it delivers on its promise.

Concerns

  • Europe's Tourist Taxes Haven't Shown Clear Crowd-Control Effects

    The case for tourist taxes as instruments of crowd management is not supported by the available research from cities where such levies have been in place the longest. Barcelona researcher Núria Guitart-Casalderrey documented that the city's charges have not deterred tourist visits; Amsterdam's experience with Europe's highest accommodation taxes produced no meaningful visitor reduction; and in Venice, researcher Jan van der Borg projected that even doubling entry fees would leave tourism at unmanageable levels. Tilburg University's Greg Richards described Amsterdam's tax as having evolved into a municipal budget mechanism, raising the question of whether it still operates as a crowd-control tool in any meaningful sense. If Japan's taxes follow the same trajectory — generating revenue while having no demonstrable effect on visitor counts — then framing them as "overtourism countermeasures" becomes a form of policy mislabeling that over-promises and under-delivers. The political cost of this framing could be significant: if residents in affected areas are told that tax measures are addressing overtourism, only to watch crowds remain at the same levels, the credibility gap undermines trust in the broader tourism governance framework. Genuine overtourism reduction almost certainly requires non-price tools — access restrictions, capacity limits, temporal distribution management — that the current policy package does not center.

  • Visa Fee Structure Creates Nationality-Based Access Disparities

    The fivefold visa fee increase distributes its burden in a highly uneven way: nationals of visa-exempt countries such as Korea, the United States, and most of the EU pay nothing, while travelers from China, India, Vietnam, the Philippines, and other visa-required countries now face a ¥15,000 single-entry fee. Foreign Minister Motegi's explanation — that the increase reflects 48 years of accumulated inflation and exchange-rate changes since the 1978 baseline — is a coherent administrative rationale, but the structural consequence remains that the cost of accessing Japan varies enormously depending on passport nationality. For travelers from rapidly growing outbound markets such as India and Vietnam, where ¥15,000 can represent a material share of total travel expenditure, this increase raises the break-even calculation on a Japan trip compared to competitors such as Korea or Thailand that impose no comparable fee. Japan's 60 million visitor target by 2030 almost certainly depends on strong growth from these same emerging Asian markets, which means the visa fee increase creates tension with the government's own traffic-growth objectives. The increase was not designed to target any specific country — but the effect is that inbound visitor dynamics increasingly bifurcate by geography: visa-exempt markets growing rapidly, visa-required markets under structural pressure. This nationality-based access asymmetry raises equity questions that go beyond the technical merits of the fee adjustment.

  • Revenue Dependency Risk and Policy Incentive Distortion

    The European precedent most relevant to Japan's situation is not the failure of tourist taxes to reduce crowds — it is the structural incentive problem that emerges once government budgets become reliant on tourism tax revenue. With national departure tax revenue projected at approximately ¥130 billion annually and Kyoto's accommodation tax heading toward ¥12.6 billion, the fiscal calculus starts to invert: declining visitor numbers become a revenue problem rather than a policy goal. Once that inversion occurs, the original "overtourism countermeasure" rationale for the tax loses its operational meaning, and the tax becomes structurally indistinguishable from any other revenue line in the government budget. The Barcelona and Amsterdam trajectories both illustrate this dynamic, with taxes initially justified as crowd management tools gradually reframing as essential municipal revenue infrastructure — a reframing that creates no incentive for local governments to actually reduce visitor volumes. Without transparent accounting of how tourist tax revenue is spent, independent auditing of whether overtourism-reduction objectives are being met, and a clear framework for what "success" looks like, the policy lacks accountability mechanisms. The risk isn't that Japan raises taxes — it's that having done so, the revenue dependency makes it structurally impossible to pursue any policy outcome that would reduce tourists and therefore reduce that revenue.

  • Measurement Failure in a Distorted Data Environment

    The fundamental policy governance problem facing Japan's tourist tax framework in 2026 is that the conditions required to evaluate whether the taxes are working simply do not exist. Measuring a price effect requires a baseline period where the variable of interest changes while other factors remain stable; Japan's 2026 data reflects simultaneous changes in tax rates, Chinese travel advisory impacts, typhoon disruptions, elevated airfares, and yen exchange-rate shifts — making causal attribution essentially impossible. JNTO's own official attribution of the 2026 visitor decline to the China advisory, flight disruptions, and airfares — not to tax increases — reflects exactly this measurement problem: the organization responsible for tracking inbound tourism cannot attribute the numbers to the policy instrument that was introduced. If the government cannot determine from available data whether the taxes are having any effect, any further policy adjustments — additional rate increases, structural changes, acceleration of non-price tools — are being made without empirical grounding. There is a reasonable argument that additional tax increases should be explicitly deferred until the China advisory situation stabilizes and a clean comparison period becomes available, since acting on unmeasurable data is an unusually high risk for a policy that affects both government revenue and destination attractiveness. The absence of a credible evaluation methodology means the public, the tourism industry, and affected residents have no reliable basis for assessing whether the government's stated policy objectives are being achieved.

Outlook

Over the short term, the most important data to watch is the JNTO monthly visitor count for October through December 2026. The period through early December, when Kyoto's autumn foliage peak winds down, will give the first real read on how the revised tax structure performs during high season. As already noted, isolating a clean "tax effect" will remain difficult given China-related turbulence and other disruptions — but the directional trend across other source markets will at least become visible. The key variables to track are whether Korean monthly arrivals hold in the 800,000–850,000 range, whether Chinese arrivals remain in the 44–61% year-on-year decline window, and whether the departure tax revenue from July through December runs anywhere near the annual ¥130 billion projection. If the actual trajectory outpaces the forecast, the government gains a strong internal justification to treat this revenue model as validated. If it falls short — with both visitor counts and tax revenue declining simultaneously — the scenario looks considerably more complicated.

The yen exchange rate is a short-term variable that cannot be ignored. JTB's 2026 inbound forecast was built on an assumed exchange rate of ¥150 to the dollar. If the yen weakens further from that baseline, Japan becomes an even more attractive value destination for travelers from Korea and other markets where the exchange rate dynamic is favorable. If the yen strengthens significantly, the combined pressure of a rising currency and higher taxes could accelerate the decline in visitor numbers beyond what the forecast anticipated. The practical reality for Korean travelers is that a ¥400 or ¥800 accommodation tax increment registers far less strongly than the difference a ten-yen move in the won-yen rate makes over the course of a trip. In an environment where exchange rates can fully offset or amplify the tax effect, evaluating tourism policy based solely on the tax variable is difficult to justify. The yen's trajectory will likely be the dominant story for second-half 2026 visitor numbers, and it's largely beyond the government's control.

Over the medium term, the single most consequential variable is whether China's foreign ministry lifts its travel advisory. Chinese arrivals have kept falling for nearly a year since the November 14, 2025 advisory — year-on-year declines of 44–61% — and that has fundamentally reshaped the inbound market. If the advisory is lifted, Chinese visitor numbers could recover rapidly. JTB's 2026 forecast of 41.4 million arrivals already assumed the advisory would remain in effect throughout the year — meaning an earlier-than-expected resolution could push actual arrivals well above that figure. If the advisory persists, Japan will have to increasingly rely on Korea, Taiwan, Southeast Asia, and Western markets for growth, making market diversification a structural priority rather than an optional strategy.

The medium-term performance of Kyoto's accommodation tax revenue is also worth watching closely. The city projected a jump from ¥5.2 billion to ¥12.6 billion annually — an increase of approximately ¥7.4 billion. If the first full year of data shows results close to that projection, it creates a template other municipalities will almost certainly study. Japan's ruling party tax reform guidelines already flagged the possibility of revisiting the departure tax rate after reviewing traveler cost impacts, which means strong Kyoto revenue data could build momentum for further increases at both the national and local levels. If revenues come in well below the projection — because accommodation demand at the top tiers softens — the city faces a more difficult calculation. The breakdown of which accommodation tiers are generating the most revenue will also matter for evaluating whether the progressive structure is functioning as intended, and whether the overtourism countermeasure spending commitments are actually being honored.

Looking further ahead, the question of whether Japan can reach 60 million visitors by 2030 looks genuinely ambitious. Getting from 2026's projected ~41.4 million to 60 million in four years requires sustained annual growth rates in the double digits — a pace that may have been plausible during the post-pandemic rebound surge, but becomes much harder to sustain once that pent-up demand is absorbed. JTB's researchers noted that growth going forward will be more closely tied to economic conditions in origin countries, which is a way of saying the high-growth era may be over. The 60 million target is likely best understood as an aspirational ceiling rather than a planning baseline — a signal to airlines, hotel developers, and regional governments about the direction of travel, even if the number itself may not be hit unless several favorable conditions align at once.

A full Chinese recovery, sustained yen weakness, significant expansion of international air routes, and rapid growth from India and other emerging outbound markets would all need to materialize simultaneously. That is a demanding set of conditions. What the target does accomplish, even if unmet, is function as an investment signal to the aviation and hospitality sectors. The expansion of international routes by Japanese carriers and the competitive push among regional airports for international flight connections are downstream effects of this target's existence. Sometimes the value of a policy goal lies more in the private investment it catalyzes than in whether the goal itself is achieved. If the infrastructure gets built and the routes get opened, the tourism sector is in better shape than if the target had never been announced.

The government's plan to expand designated overtourism response zones from 47 to 100 also deserves attention as a long-term strategic move. This isn't about reducing overall visitors — it's about redistributing demand from Tokyo, Kyoto, and Osaka across more of Japan. If departure tax revenue actually flows into regional tourism infrastructure as promised — transportation connections, multilingual signage, accommodation capacity — it creates a supply-side expansion model for handling more visitors rather than trying to restrict them through price. That's structurally more promising as an overtourism solution than tax-based deterrence. It's also substantially harder and slower: building out transit infrastructure, multilingual services, and lodging capacity in regional destinations is a five-to-ten-year investment cycle. Collecting taxes can start tomorrow; building what those taxes are supposed to fund takes years.

The more revealing 2030 target may actually be the per-visitor spending goal: raising average consumption from approximately ¥229,000 to ¥250,000 — a roughly 9% increase. That figure is achievable through a combination of tax contributions adding to per-visit expenditure statistics, favorable exchange-rate conditions, longer average stays, and growth in higher-value tourism products. The ¥15 trillion total spending target has interesting arithmetic: if Japan reaches 45 million visitors spending an average of ¥333,000 each, that also hits ¥15 trillion — without needing anywhere near 60 million visitors. This is what I mean when I say the spending target is probably the real anchor. The visitor count headline is the political number; the consumption target is what drives the financial planning. Building in that buffer means even a "failed" visitor count target doesn't necessarily mean a failed tourism revenue outcome.

The dual-layer tax structure Japan operates — a national departure tax alongside city-level accommodation taxes — gives it stronger revenue capture than any individual European city, but it also creates coordination risks. If the national government wants to push the departure tax higher while Kyoto, Tokyo, and Osaka are simultaneously raising their own accommodation taxes, travelers face compounding layers of charges. Right now the total burden is ¥3,000 in departure tax plus a few hundred to a few thousand yen in accommodation tax — manageable. But if both levels escalate independently, the cumulative impact could start to register more meaningfully in price-sensitive segments. How the central government and municipalities coordinate their tax ambitions over the medium term is a policy governance question that could define whether this model remains calibrated or tips into overreach.

Japan is running the largest-scale experiment in tourist taxation in Asia right now, and other regional governments are almost certainly paying attention. Thailand, Indonesia, and Malaysia have all debated their own tourist levy frameworks, and South Korea has already begun discussing overtourism pressures in parts of Seoul. If Japan successfully demonstrates that progressive accommodation taxes can raise substantial revenue while keeping visitor numbers growing, those results will serve as a reference point for the region. If Japan instead experiences declining visitors alongside declining tax revenue — a scenario where the taxes deter more than intended — that outcome will also shape the conversation. The data Japan generates over the next twelve to eighteen months will carry weight well beyond its own policy decisions, making this experiment worth watching regardless of which destination you plan to visit next.

Sources / References

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